Between 1978 and 1985 the average child supported award measured in constant dollars for divorced women in the U.s. declined by 21 percent (Current Population Reports, 1981 and 1987). During the same period the laws regarding child custody arrangements have changed dramatically. Joint legal and physical custody arrangements are becoming more common, thus allowing fathers greater input into child rearing. In this proposal we explore the relationship between child custody/visitation arrangements and financial transfers at divorce. To address the issues relating to the determinants of the initial divorce settlement, we develop an economic model where the various components of the divorce bargain--custody and visitation, child support, child investment, and the division of marital property--are simultaneously determined. The model is tested using a unique data set collected by the Stanford Child Custody Project which contains detailed longitudinal information on both the outcome and the process of divorce negotiations. The high rate of delinquency in child support payments by non-custodial fathers has also received increasing attention. According to statistics calculated from the 1986 Current Population Survey, women divorced during 1984 and owed support only received 63 percent of what was due. Of this same sample, 23 percent reported receiving no payment at all. Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain this delinquent behavior. These hypotheses relate to three general factors: 1) changes in the circumstances of either the custodial or non-custodial parent that might alter the ability or willingness to pay (e.g. employment and income changes, remarriage; 2) a strategic response to non-compliance in some other aspect of the divorce agreement by the custodial parent (e.g., withholding visitation privileges); 3) the non-custodial parent initially has little interest in the children, or loses interest in subsequent years. Because of the lack of adequate data there have been few empirical tests of these hypotheses. In this proposal the Stanford Child Custody Data are used to estimate the contribution of each of these factors to the problem of non-payment of child support payments.